

## Message Text

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ORIGIN NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /011 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA:AGLASPIE

APPROVED BY: NEA: ALATHERTON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 243491

FOLLOWING REPEAT SECTO 10052 SENT ACTION AMMAN, TEL AVIV,  
DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JIDDA, LONDON, USUN INFO JERUSALEM,  
MOSCOW, SECSTATE 06 OCT 77

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTO 10052

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON'S BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
ATHERTON'S BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO THE PRESS OCTOBER 5  
FOLLOWING THE EXTENDED MEETING OCTOBER 4 BETWEEN ISRAELI  
FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN, THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY  
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VANCE. POST MAY DRAW ON IT AS NEEDED IN RESPONSE TO  
QUERIES FROM HOST GOVERNMENTS.  
BRIEFING BY SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL ON  
MIDEAST NEGOTIATIONS

12:05 P.M. EDT

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THE GROUND RULES ARE ALL THE SAME?

MR SHERMAN: HAVE THE GROUND RULES BEEN ESTABLISHED?

Q YES, BACKGROUND.

MR CHERMAN: WHICH IS WHAT? U.S. OFFICIAL?

Q: U.S. OFFICIAL.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE THOUGHT THAT GIVEN THE LATE HOUR OF THE ENDING OF THE MEETINGS AND FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN'S REMARKS, AND THE RELEASE OF OUR JOINT STATEMENT LAST NIGHT, THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN A LITTLE BIT EXACTLY WHAT THE MAIN THINGS WERE THAT WE FEEL WERE ACCOMPLISHED.

IN FACT, JODY SAID, I VBELIEVE AT THE END THAT ANY QUESTIONS FROM THE U. . SIDE WOULD HAVE TO BE ASKED TODAY.

BASICALLY THIS IS WHAT I AM HERE TO TRY TO DO. LET ME JUST TRY TO TICK OFF WHAT SEEMED TO ME THE POINTS I WANT TO BRING OUT, WAHT SEEMED TO US THE HIGHLIGHTS. FIRST OF ALL, WE DID, I THINK, SUCCEED IN CLEARING UP MISUNDERSTAND INGS AND CONFUSION THAT CAME OUT OF THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT AND HAVE, I THINK, SUCCEDED IN REMOVING THAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

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AN ISSUE THAT MIGHT HAVE COMPLICATED THE EFFORTS TO GET ON TO GENEVA.

WE MADE CLEAR THAT PARTICIPATION IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338; THAT THE US-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT CLEARLY REMAINS IN EFFECT AS THE VIEW OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN, BUT THAT WE DO NOT AND CANNOT EXPECT ALL THE PARTIES TO AGREE WITH ALL PARTS OF THE VIEWS THAT WERE STATED IN THAT JOINT STATEMENT.

THAT IS ONE POINT. THE SECOND POINT HAS TO DO WITH THE REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THAT WE AND THE ISRAELIS ISSUED LAST NIGHT REFERRING TO PROPOSALS FOR REMOVING OBSTACLES TO RECONVENING THE CONFERENCE. I AM IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT POSITION IN THAT I CANNOT GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS, THE WORKING PAPER THAT THE MINISTER REFERRED TO, ANYMORE THAN HE COULD, EXCEPT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTICIPATING PARTIES IN THE CONFERENCE WILL BE THE ISRAELIS ON ONE SIDE AND A UNITED ARAB DELEGATION ON THE OTHER SIDE, WHICH WILL INCLUDE PALESTINIANS. BUT I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO AT LEAST TRY TO DESCRIBE THE STATUS OF THESE PROPOSALS IN THAT

WORKING PAPER.

WHAT WE DID LAST NIGHT WAS TO BUILD ON FORMULATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF WEEKS WITH ALL THE PARTIES AND AS ALWAYS HAPPENS IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS, THEY HAVE BEEN EVOLVING WITH EACH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

WE ARE TRYING TO ULTIMATELY COME TO A COMMON FORMULATION THAT ALL THE PARTIES CAN ACCEPT AS A BASIS FOR GOING TO GENEVA AND FOR DEALING WITH IN PARTICULAR, THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION QUESTION WHICH IS, QUITE CLEARLY, THE MAJOR, ALTHOUGH NOT THE ONLY QUESTION RELATING TO CONVENING AND ORGANIZING THE CONFERENCE WHICH THERE  
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HAS TO BE AGREEMENT ON IF WE ARE GOING TO GET THERE.

WE DID SUCCEED LAST NIGHT IN MANY HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS IN DEVELOPING PROPOSALS WHICH REPRESENT, IN EFFECT, A NEW VARIATION ON THE FORMULATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEEN WORKING OUT AND DISCUSSING AND EVOLVING IN OUR TALKS WITH ALL THE PARTIES.

WHAT WE HAVE NOW IS SOMETHING WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS CHECKING OUT WITH HIS GOVERNMENT AND WHICH WE SAID WE WOULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS WITH THE ARABS.

WE DO NOT HAVE AN AGREED BASIS FOR GOING TO GENEVA. I HAVE SEEN SOME OF THE PRESS HEADLINES AND LEADS WHICH HAVE RATHER GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS NOW AN AGREED BASIS FOR GENEVA, AND THAT WE ARE PRACTICALLY THERE.

I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO CORRECT THAT IMPRESSION. I THINK THAT WE DID MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN THIS LAST NIGHT IN MOVING TOWARDS A FORMULATION WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. BUT IT IS STILL ONE THAT IS IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION.

AFTER WE HAVE TALKED TO THE ARABS AND AFTER THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK AT IT, IT IS QUITE CONCEIVABLE THAT THERE WILL HAVE TO BE FURTHER CHANGES AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. SO THAT THIS IS NOT IN ANY SIMPLE SENSE AN AGREED PROPOSAL OR AN AGREED WORKING PAPER FOR GOING TO GENEVA AT THIS POINT. IT IS SOMETHING THAT WE AND MR. DAYAN AGREED WAS A BASIS FOR WHICH WE WOULD EACH--HE WOULD GO TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND WE WOULD GO TO  
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THE ARABS. THAT IS WHERE IT IS AT THE PRESENT TIME.

Q IS IT TRUE THAT YOU, THAT IS THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS LAST NIGHT, LIKE MR. DAYAN, AGREED ON THE WORDS?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE HAVE AGREED ON THE WORDS OF THE WORKING PAPER WHICH HE AND WE WILL CHECK OUT; HE WITH HIS GOVERNMENT AND WE WITH THE ARABS, WHICH REPRESENTS SOME PROGRESS FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW TOWARD SOMETHING THAT WE THINK AND HOPE MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES. BUT WE CLEARLY CANNOT SAY THAT AT THIS POINT.

Q I WOULD ASSUMRE THAT THE UNITED STATES, HAVING BEEN IN NEGOTIATION WITH ALL THE PARTIES, PRESUMABLY WOULD NOT BE PUTTING TO THE ISRAELIS WITH THEIR ACCEPTANCE, TERMS WHICH IT DID NOT BELIEVE WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS OR IS THAT AN OVERSTATEMENT?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I THINK THAT IS AN OVERSTATEMENT. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THIS WASN'T JUST SOMETHING WE PUT AS A PROPOSAL TO THE ISRAELIS. WE BOTH HAVE HISTORY NOW OF A NUMBER OF MEETINGS WHERE WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING FORMULATIONS AND WE WORKED OUT SOMETHING TOGETHER IN THESE TALKS. WHAT WE PRODUCED LAST NIGHT WS SOMETHING THAT REPRESENTS A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WENT ON FOR SEVERAL HOURS LAST NIGHT.

LET ME JUST ADD ONE OTHER THING. CLEARLY, WE HAVE SOME IDEA OF WHAT THE ARABS WOULD LIKE TO SEE IN SUCH A WORKING PAPER. BUT IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT IN THE END WHATEVER RESULTS, IF THERE IS AGREEMENT, IS NOT GOING TO HAVE EVERYTHING IN IT THAT EVERYBODY WOULD LIKE TO SEE.

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Q I RECOGNIZE THAT. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO PURSUE THAT. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT YOU DO KNOW THAT, I AM STILL GROPING FOR AN ANSER TO THE FACT THAT IN AGREEING TO TERMS WITH ISRAEL THAT IT MIGHT ACCEPT, I PRESUME YOU EXPECT THAT THESE TERMS WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM THERE? OR IF NOT, FRANKLY, WHY HAVE THEY BEEN AGREED TO IF IT DOESN'T LOOK LIKE THEY--IF

THERE IS NOT A 75 PERCENT CHANCE THAT IT WILL FLY?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WITHOUT TRYING TO PUT ANY PERCENTAGE CHANCES ON IT, ALL WE AGREED TO IS TO TRY THIS OUT ON THE ARABS. WE CANNOT SAY THAT THE ARABS WILL ACCEPT IT AS IT IS.

Q HOW ABOUT THE RUSSIANS, IS THERE ANY OSOUNDING OUT OF THE RUSSIANS, WILL THEY BE ABLE TO CHANGE THINGS?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: AT THIS POINT WE ARE DISCUSSING THIS OURSELVES WITH THE PARTIES. THIS IS NOT A JOINT U.S. SOVIET--

1 LET ME ASK YOU ONE OTHER THING. IS IT POSSIBLE THERE WILL BE AN AGREED WORKING PAPER DEVELOPING NOW BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARABS? AFTER ALL, YOU HAVE HAD ONE WITH THE RUSSIANS. YOU HAVE HAD ONE WITH ISRAEL. YOU HAVE HAD THE RUSSIAN VIEWS ON PAPER NOW SOMEPLACE FLOATING AROUND AS THE ISRAELI POSITION. WOULD YOU CONTEMPLATE DOING SOMETHING WITH THE ARABS AND THEN GOING BACK TO MURRAY'S QUESTION, WHAT IS THE POINT, IF THERE REALLY ISN'T A CONSENSUS THAT YOU HAVE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I THINK YOU ARE MIXING APPLES AND ORANGES. WE HAVE A JOINT STATEMENT WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIETS.

Q THE CO-CHAIRMEN AGREED WHAT IT SHOULD LOOK LIKE IN GENEVA?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THEY AGREED ON CERTAIN PRINCIPLES FOR GENEVA IN THAT STATEMENT, AS THE CO-CHAIRMEN.

LET ME SAY, ALSO, IT SAYS IN THERE THAT THERE STILL REMAIN DIFFERENCES ON ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. IT IS PRECISELY THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THIS WORKING PAPER.

THIS IS WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO GET, A WORKING PAPER THAT WILL NOT BE A SEPARATE ONE FROM THE ARABS. WE WANT TO GET A WORKING PAPER THAT ISRAEL AND THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS CAN AGREE TO IN COMMON.

Q ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE THINGS IN THIS WORKING PAPER DON'T NECESSARILY ALL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT SOME OF THESE ISSUES ARE OPEN FOR CHANGE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WHAT I AM SAYING IS WE ARE TRYING TO ACT AS AN HONEST MEDIATOR HERE TO TRY TO GET BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT.

Q IT IS BASICALLY AN AGREEMENT THAT ISRAEL WILL TAKE THIS AND GO WITH IT TO ITS GOVERNMENT, DAYAN WILL, AND YOU WILL TAKE THIS AND GO WITH IT TO THE ARABS. IT ISN'T AN AGREEMENT IN THAT SENSE. THE AGREEMENT IS IT WILL BE TRIED OUT.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THAT IS RIGHT. IT IS A DRAFT WHICH THEY AND WE HAVE AGREED TO TRY OUT, BUT WE HAVE AGREED ON THE FORM OF THE DRAFT AT THIS STATE WITH THE FULL UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS STILL OPEN AND MAY HAVE TO CONFIDENTIAL

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BE OPEN FOR FURTHER CHANGES.

DAYAN SAID THAT IN ANSWERING ONE OF THE QUESTIONS LAST NIGHT, THIS TENTATIVE, PRELIMINARY. THERE MAY HAVE TO BE FURTHER CHANGES.

Q THE FORMULATION IS NEW , SO THAT THE ARABS WILL NOT HAVE SEEN IT IN THIS WAY BEFORE, IS THAT CORRECT?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THAT IS CORRECT.

Q YOUR SENSE OF IT NOW IS WHAT? YOU HAVE TALKED TO KHADDAM.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: MY SENSE OF IT IS THAT WE HAVE MOVED A LITTLE BIT FURTHER TOWARD AN ACCEPTABLE COMMON FORMULATION. WHETHER WE HAVE GOT IT NOW OR NOT, WE SIMPLY WON'T KNOW UNTIL WE HAVE HAD ARAB REACTIONS.

I THINK JOHN WAS NEXT OVER HERE.

Q I CAME IN A FEW MINUTES LATE, SO I MAY HAVE MISSED THIS, IT YOU TOUCHED ON IT. TO WHAT EXTENT CAN YOU TALK ABOUT WHAT PROGRESS WAS MADE WITH ISRAEL IN RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND SPECIFICALLY ANY ROLE AT ALL FOR THE PLO? CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THAT?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO THE SUBSTANCE.

Q CAN YOU SAY THAT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THAT?

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SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I SAID THAT ALREADY.  
I THINK THIS REPRESENTS PROGRESS FROM THE PREVIOUS FORMULATIONS,  
I TRYING TO ARRIVE AT A FORMUATION THAT ISRAEL ACCEPTS AND  
WHICH HOEPFULLY THE ARABS CAN ACCEPT.

Q ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THAT IS ONE OF THE MAIN ISSUES IN THE PAPER,  
YES.

A ARE THERE STILL DIFFERENCES, THEN, BETWEEN THE AMERICAN  
POSITION AND THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THOSE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE DON'T REALLY HAVE AN AMERICAN POSITION  
ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. WHATEVER BOTH SIDES CAN AGREE TO  
IS FINE WITH US. THAT IS THE POINT. WE ARE TRYING TO BE AN  
HONEST MEDIATOR WITH BOTH SIDES ON THIS. WE DID COME TO A  
JUDGMENT SOMETIME AGO, AFTER TALKING TO BOTH SIDES AT GREAT  
LENGTH, THAT THE CONCEPT OF THE UNITED ARAB DELEGATION OFFERED  
AN OPENING THAT IT CAN BE RESOLVED, AND WE INDICATED TO ALL  
OF THEM THAT WE THOUGHT THIS WAS ONE OF THE VIEWS WE ARE CONVERGING  
TOWARDS.

I THINK WE HAVE GOT TO THE POINT WHERE VIEWS HAVE CONVERGED  
ON THAT AS A CONCEPT. NOW WE HAVE TO SPELL OUT HOW THAT  
CONCEPT IS TRANSLATED INTO NUTS AND BOLTS.

Q DID YOU TRY THIS ON THE SYRIANS THIS MORNING, AND CAN  
YOU GIVE US ANY IDEA OF THEIR RESPONSE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: JODY POWELL SAID THAT, IN HIS STATEMENT,  
THAT SECRETARY VANCE WILL BE DISCUSSING THE PROPOSALS WITH THE  
ARABS. WE DID BEGIN WITH KHADDAM TO DISCUSS THEM. I DON'T  
WANT TO GIVE REACTIONS OF THE PARTIES TO THESE THINGS, EXCEPT  
TO SAY OBVIOUSLY KHADDAM IS GOING TO HAVE TO REPORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT  
THE SAME AS DAYAN.

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Q LAST NIGHT FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN SAID, "THE  
ISRAELI POSITION IS THAT WE SHALL NOT NEGOTIATE AND HAVE IN  
GENEVA THE PLO." NO MATTER HOW YOU FORMULATE IT, NO MATTER  
WHAT FORM THE AGREED POSITION IS, THIS STILL APPEARS TO BE A  
DIRECT CONTRADICTION WITH EVERYTHING THAT THE ARABS, INCLUDING  
THE SYRIANS HAVE SAID.

DO YOU HAVE ANY KIND OF FORMULA FOR GETTING AROUND THAT?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: LET ME SAY WE ARE TRYING TO FIND A FORMULA TO GET AROUND IT. WE THINK WE HAVE SOMETHING THAT MOVES A LITTLE CLOSER. THAT IS ALL I WANT TO SAY.

Q DOES THAT INVOLVE THE PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THAT SUBJECT NEVER EVEN CAME UP.

Q COULD YOU TRY TO CONNECT YOUR POINT ONE WITH THE POINT TWO, IN A SENSE, DID THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STATEMENT OF SATURDAY HELP OR HURT OR HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS OF LAST NIGHT? DID RATTLING THE ISRAELI CAGE MAKE THEM MORE AMENABLE OR DID IT MAKE IT TOUGHER? (LAUGHTER)

Q THAT WAS DELICATELY PUT.

Q THIS IS ON BACKGROUND.

Q THE QUESTIONS AREN'T ON BACKGROUND.

MR. SCHECTER: IS THAT THE OFFICIAL NEWSWEEK DISCUSSIONS? (LAUGHTER)

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SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WITHOUT ADDRESSING MYSELF DIRECTLY TO THE WAY YOU FORMULATED YOUR QUESTION, CLEARLY THE U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT CREATED CERTAIN, RAISED CERTAIN QUESTIONS IN ISRAEL. I THINK BASED PERHAPS UPON A MISPERCEPTION THAT SOMEHOW THIS STATEMENT WAS SOMETHING THAT WE WERE NOW EXPECTING THE PARTIES TO SIGN ON TO AS A BASIS FOR GENEVA.

WHAT WE SUCCEEDED IN DOING AND WE SAID IT EXPLICITLY IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THAT WE AND THE ISRAELIS ISSUED LAST NIGHT, THAT THAT TEXT -- THE WORDS ARE VERY CLEAR, "ACCEPTANCE OF THE JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 1 BY THE PARTIES IS NOT A PREREQUISITE FOR THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE."

IT HAD NEVER BEEN SO IN OUR MINDS. BUT WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE THIS EXPLICIT ON THE RECORD, PUBLICLY AFTER THE TALKS WITH DAYAN SO THAT IT WOULD ALSO ELIMINATE ANY CONFUSION THAT THERE APPARENTLY WAS ON THAT SCORE.

Q COULD YOU ANSWER SCOTT'S QUESTION ANY MORE SPECIFICALLY? DID IT HELP YOU IN ANY WAY, DID IT HELP YOU WITH THE ARABS ABOUT HAVING DECLARED LEGITIMATE RIGHTS? IS THAT IMPORTANT



LEVERAGE IN THE "MEDIATING" ROLE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE HAVEN'T REALLY, EXCEPT IN THIS RATHER BRIEF INTERVIEW WITH KHADDAM HAD ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARABS SINCE THAT STATEMENT.

Q YOU TALKED TO THE EGYPTIANS YESTERDAY.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THAT IS RIGHT. ON THAT ONE, THE PRESIDENT MET WITH FAHMY. I REALLY CAN'T GIVE YOU ANY BACKGROUND ON IT, ON THE PRESIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THESE PEOPLE.

Q IS THE PROBLEM THAT YOU HVE WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE NOW REITERATED IN THE JOINTSTATEMENT WITH ISRAEL  
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LAST NIGHT THAT 338 AND 242 REMAIN THE BASIS FOR GENEVA AND THAT IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE U.S.-SOVIET DECLARATION? IS THERE ANY DANGER THAT THE RUSSIANS FEEL THAT THERE MAY BE SOME ADDITIONAL RESOLUTION OR THAT THAT JOINT DECLARATION MIGHT IN SOME WAY BECOME THE BASIS FOR GENEVA RATHER THAN OR IN ADDITION TO 242 AND 338?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I DON'T THINK THE RUSSIANS HAVE ANY DOUBT ABOUT OUR VIEW THAT 242 AND 338 ARE THE AGREED BASIS FOR GENEVA.

Q BUT WHAT IS THEIR VIEW?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I HAVEN'T HEARD ANYTHING FROM THEM. I DON'T WANT TO TRY TO SPECULATE ON WHAT THEIR REACTION WOULD BE. I JUST HAVEN'T HEARD YET.

Q COULD YOU GIVE US A BETTER IDEA RETROSPECTIVELY, THREE DAYS AFTER IT, JUST EXACTLY WHAT YOU DID AIM FOR IN ISSUING THE JOINT STATEMENT OVER THE WEEKEND? IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IF THE PLO ACCEPTED IT, YOU MIGHT HAVE MADE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD, BUT THAT HASN'T YET HAPPENED. I AM STILL A BIT PUZZLED AS TO THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF IT.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I CAN'T HONESTLY ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT I SAID OUR INTENTIONS AND PURPOSES WERE WHEN I MET WITH ALL OF YOU THE DAY THE STATEMENT WAS GIVEN.

Q DO YOU EXPECT THE ISRAELIS TO REPUDIATE IT AS THEY DID LAST NIGHT?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: YOU MEAN IN DAYAN'S COMMENTS TO THE PRESSB

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Q NO, EARLIER.

MR. SHERMAN: THE CABINET REPUDIATED IT ON SUNDAY.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE SIMPLY DID NOT PRESENT THIS AS SOMETHING WE WERE ASKING THE PARTIS TO ACCEPT OR REJECT. WE WERE SIMPLY ISSUING SOMETHING WHICH WAS A REFLECTION OF THOSE VIEWS ON WHICH THE JOINT CO-CHAIRMEN COULD AGREE.

I THINK I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT IS NOT THE TOTALITY OF OUR POSITION. THEY WERE THOSE ELEMENTS OF OUR POSITION ON WHICH WE FOUND COMMON GROUND WITH THE SOVIETS.

Q THE UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION ON ONE SIDE, ISRAEL ON THE OTHER, THERE WAS SUCH A MOVE BEFORE BY THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL; THE CABINET APPROVED IT. THERE TURNED OUT TO BE A BIG SQUABBLE AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE ADOPTING THE AMERICAN IDEA.

YOU REFERRED TWICE NOW TO THIS BEING THE APPROACH. WHAT CAN YOU TELL US NOW? HAS IT SHARPENED ISRAEL'S IMPRESSION LAST WEEK OR MAYBE TWO WEEKS AGO NOW, THAT THIS WILL BE JUST FOR A CEREMONIAL OPENING AND THEN IT MIGHT BREAK DOWN INTO BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS?

I HAVE A STRONG HUNCH FROM WHAT YOU HAVE SAID HERE FROM THE TIMES NOW THAT THAT IS WHERE THE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. YOU SAID YOU CAN'T GO INTO THE WORKING PAPER. BUT YOU HAVE SAID PALESTINIANS AND A UNIFIED DELEGATION. ARE YOU CERTAINLY LEAVING ME WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PALESTINIANS WILL BE THERE FOR MORE THAN JUST A CEREMONIAL OPENING.

CAN YOU DEVELOP THIS? I THINK ISRAEL GAVE GROUND ON THIS FROM WAHT YOU ARE SAYING.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I WISH I COULD BUT I CAN'T GET INTO THE  
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SUBSTANCE.

Q WHEN YOU SAID THEY AGREED ON A UNITED ARAB DELEGATION, IS IT THAT THOE ARABS WOULD BE IN A JORDANIAN GROUP?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THIS GETS AGAIN TO THE SUBSTANCE OF IT.

Q HOW DETAILED IS THE WORKING PAPER?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: IT IS SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED TO TRY TO GET AT THE NEGOTIATIONS --

Q YESTERDAY IN THE BRZEZINSKI BRIEFING HE SAID THAT PLO HAS TO OPEN ITS OWN DOOR TO GET TO THE TALKS AND IT IS UP TO THE PLO TO ADJUST ITS POSITION TO BRING IT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE STANDARDS.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WHAT ARE YOU READING FROM?

Q THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT.

Q QUOTES OF BRZEZINSKI WHEN QUOTING HIMSELF. (LAUGHTER) IS THAT THE PRINCIPAL OF THE PAPER WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT IF THE PLO CHANGES ITS WAYS THEY WILL BE ELIGIBLE TO JOIN AT SOME LATER DATE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THAT IS, I AM AFRAID, ANOTHER QUESTION IF I ANSWERED AS PUT, WE WILL BE GETTING INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WORKING PAPER WHICH I DON'T WANT TO DO.

BUT WE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT 242 AND 338 ARE THE BASIS FOR THE CONFERENCE. AS HE SAID IN THIS BRIEFING YESTERDAY -- I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU CAN MAKE IT CLEARER. THE PEOPLE WHO ARE AT THIS CONFERENCE CLEARLY HAVE TO BE THERE ON THE BASIS OF CONFIDENTIAL

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OF 242 AND 338.

Q COULD YOU TELL US WHETHER THIS FORMULA IS RELATED IN YOUR MIND TO ACTION THAT COULD BE PENDING BEFORE THE UN WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: IF I UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION CORRECTLY --

Q I COULD REPHRASE IT.

Q WOULD YOU REPHRASE IT?

Q ARE YOU EXPECTING ACTION IN THE UN THAT HAS TO BE COORDINATED AND BE MADE PART OF THIS FORMULA BEFORE IT BECOMES ACCEPTABLE TO EVERYBODY?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THE ANSWER IS CLEARLY NO. WE MADE CLEAR, WE THINK, THAT THE ACTION OUGHT TO BE IN THESE DIPLOMATIC TALKS AND THAT THIS IS NOT A PARTICULARLY PROPITIOUS TIME FOR ACTION IN THE UN.

Q IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANY ADDITIONAL RESOLUTIONS THAT

HAVE TO BE PASSED?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: NO, I CAN TELL YOU THAT IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANY ADDITIONAL RESOLUTIONS.

Q DOES THAT ALSO MAKE YOUR TASK EASIER IN THAT REGARD IN THE UN?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I THINK WE ALL FELT IF WE CAN FIND AN AGREED FORMULA FOR GOING TO GENEVA, THAT THERE WILL BE LESS PERCEIVED NEED ON THE PART OF SOME PEOPLE FOR ACTION IN THE UN, BECAUSE THAT IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVES BEHIND SOME OF THE PROPOSALS FLOATING AROUND.

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Q NOT ONLY DID YOU TWICE NOW REFER TO THE JOINT ARAB DELEGATION, BUT LAST NIGHT DAYAN CLEARLY SPELLED OUT TWO THINGS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT. HE VERY POINTEDLY REFRAINED FROM INCLUDING, AMONG THE THINGS THEY ARE NOT GOING TO ACCEPT, A JOINT ARAB DELEGATION.

IT SEEMS TO ME IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO AT LEAST DISCUSS WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAVE MADE SOME MOVEMENT FROM THEIR POSITION OF A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE JOINT DELEGATION, BUT REALLY ONLY FOR CEREMONIAL PURPOSES. HAVE THEY MOVED OFF THAT PARTICULAR SPOT?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I AM SORRY. I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO WHAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS OR WHERE IN ANY PRECISE WAY THE MOVEMENT IS. ALL I AM SAYING IS WE THINK WE HAVE PROGRESSED SOMEWHAT FROM THE FORMULATION WE WERE DISCUSSING EARLIER ON THIS QUESTION.

Q LET ME REPHRASE THE QUESTION. YOU WOULD NOT LEAD ME AWAY, THEN, FROM THAT OBSERVATION THAT THIS WAS A POINT THAT DAYAN VERY CLEARLY DID NOT MAKE LAST NIGHT? HE IS NOT A MAN WHO OVERLOOKS THIS KIND OF THING.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I THINK I WILL HAVE TO LET YOU DRAW YOUR OWN CONCLUSIONS.

Q CAN YOU GIVE US ANY HELP ON TIME FRAME? DAYAN LAST NIGHT SAID HE EXPECTED VERY QUICK ACTION BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND AFTER ALL YOU AND THE SECRETARY ARE HERE FOR ONLY FOUR MORE DAYS, WILL YOU EXPECT YOU WILL EITHER KNOW OR NOT KNOW -- WE HOPE -- WHETHER THERE IS ROUGHT AGREEMENT AMONG ALL THE PARTIES ON THIS THING BY THE TIME YOU GO BACK TO WASHINGTON?

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SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE WOULD LIKE TO, OF COURSE, HAVE AGREEMENT BY THEN.

Q IS THAT REALISTIC?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: IT REALLY DEPENDS ON WHAT THE REACTION OF THE OTHER PARTIES IS AT THIS POINT. WE ARE NOT SORT OF SETTING A CUT-OFF DATE OF THE DAY THE SECRETARY GETS BACK TO WASHINGTON. WE CAN HAVE EXCHANGES WITH ALL THE GOVERNMENTS IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WE WILL SIMPLY CONTINUE THEN IN WHATEVER IS THE MOST PRACTICAL AND CONVENIENT WAY WHEREEVER WE ARE OR WHEREEVER THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE, EITHER HERE OR SOMEWHERE ELSE.

Q MAYBE I AM MISREADING YOUR QUESTION HERE. YOU HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE ARABS AT GREAT LENGTH THROUGHOUT ALL THIS. YOU PROBABLY HAVE A VERY GOOD IDEA OF WHAT THEY COULD BUY AND NOT BUY AT A CERTAIN POINT. I AM DRAWING THE INFERENCE THAT IN THE WORKING PAPER YOU HAVE WORKED OUT WITH THE ISRAELIS THERE MAY BE SOME POINTS IN THERE THAT YOU THINK THE ARABS PROBABLY WON'T ACCEPT, BUT THAT FOR THE PURPOSES OF TRYING IT OUT ON THE ARABS, YOU HAVE AGREED TO THE ISRAELI POINT AND YOU HAVE TOLD THE ISRAELIS YOU DON'T THINK IT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT YOU WILL TRY IT OUT. IS THAT A FAIR INFERENCE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE HAVE NOT PREJUDGED THE ARAB REACTION. WE HAVE EVERY HOPE THEY WILL FIND IT ACCEPTABLE. I THINK THE KEY POINT IN YOUR QUESTION IS WE HAVE A PRETTY GOOD IDEA OF WHAT THE PARTIES, OR A PARTICULAR PARTY, WILL ACCEPT OR NOT ACCEPT AT A PARTICULAR POINT.

WE ARE GOING FROM ONE POINT TO ANOTHER. THAT IS, AFTER ALL, THE ESSENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS. PEOPLE SOMETIMES, OVER THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS, ACCEPT SOMETHING LATER THEY WOULDN'T ACCEPT EARLIER.

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Q I GUESS THE REAL POINT I WAS TRYING TO MAKE WAS IN AN EFFORT TO GET AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS DID THE AMERICANS AGREE TO LANGUAGE THAT YOU FELT PRETTY CERTAIN WOULD NOT FLY?

Q WITH THE ARABS.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: NO. I THINK IT IS LANGUAGE THAT WE THINK HAS A CHANCE OF FLYING, BUT WE ARE PERFECTLY PREPARED TO HAVE TO TRY SOME MORE VARIATIONS IF WE COME BACK AND FIND CERTAIN ELEMENTS DIFFICULT. I THINK THE ISRAELIS CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT, TOO, AS DAYAN SAID LAST NIGHT.

Q THE OPPOSITE, I THINK, WOULD HAVE TO BE TRUE THAT YOU HAVE AGREED WITH ISRAEL ON A PRETTY SOLID FORMULA THAT REMAINS OPEN TO CHANGE. YOU WOULDN'T BE SURPRISED IT IF IS CHANGED, YOU WOULDN'T BE SURPRISED IF THE ARABS DIDN'T LIKE CERTAIN THINGS, AND YOU MIGHT EVEN CHANGE THEM. BUT IT ISN'T SORT OF A FLABBY U.S. -ISRAELI JUST-FOR-THE-DAY VIEW OF THINGS TO SORT OF KEEP THINGS IN MOTION, IT MUST BE SOMETHING RATHER SOLID THAT IS CHANGEABLE.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE DID SPEND SIX HOURS TALKING ABOUT IT, OF COURSE.

Q IT IS EITHER BERNIE'S APPROACH OR NONE. EITHER YOU HAVE SOMETHING YOU KNOW ISN'T GOING TO GET THROUGH SO IT IS KIND OF NOT VERY CONCRETE, OR IT IS CONCRETE BUT YOU KNOW THAT IT IS OPEN TO CHANGE. WHICH IS IT? DO YOU HAVE AN AGREEMENT? DON'T YOU HAVE AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL THAT IS CHANGEABLE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: BELIEVE IT OR NOT, IT IS CONFIDENTIAL

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BOTH. WE THINK WE HAVE SOMETHING THAT REPRESENTS AN ADVANCE OVER WHERE WE WERE. IN THAT SENSE I THINK IT IS A PRETTY SOLID BASIS FOR GOING BACK TO THE ARABS. BUT WE ALSO ARE PERFECTLY PREPARED TO HAVE TO GO BACK WITH THE ISRAELIS AGAIN. THEY ARE PREPARED FOR US TO DO THAT.

Q DO YOU THINK IT WILL FLY?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I AM NOT GOING TO CHARACTERIZE ANY OF THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES.

Q HOW DO YOU FEEL PERSONALLY NOW? ARE YOU STILL ENTHUSED, ENCOURAGED? YOU SAID IT IS LANGUAGE WE THINK HAS A CHANCE OF FLYING. DO YOU STILL THINK THAT AFTER YOUR MEETING WITH KHADDAM?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: LIK, FIRST OF ALL, THERE ARE THREE ARAB PARTIES WE ARE TALKING ABOUT. THEY ARE NOT ALL GOING TO REACT IN THE SAME WAY. PRESUMABLY THEY WILL BE CONSULTING AMONG THEMSELVES ON THEIR REACTIONS. SO, THAT WAS NOT MEANT TO BE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE REACTION OF

ANY ONE PARTY, WHERE A JUDGMENT THAT WE THINK TAKING THE ARABS COLLECTIVELY HAS A CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTED. OR LET ME PUT IT EVEN MORE PRECISELY, A CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTED IN LARTGE PART. I REALLY THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT WE HOPE IT WILL BE ACCEPTED BUT WE REALLY DO HAVE TO BE OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REFINEMENTS.

Q DO THEY ALL HAVE THE TEXT OF WHAT YOU AGREED TO, THE EGYPTIANS?

SENIOR U. S. OFFICIAL: NOT YET. BUT WE ARE GOING TO DO THIS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

Q ON THE ARAB DELEGATION, IS THIS GOING TO CONFIDENTIAL

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BE A WORKING FUNCTIONING ARAB DELEGATION, OR ARE THEY GOING TO STAY LONG ENOUGHT TO GET THEIR PICTURE TAKEN AND THEN SPLIT UP INTO GROUPS?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE HAVEN'T GOOTTEN AN AGREED FORMULA YET. IT WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION WHEN WE HAVE SOMETHING THAT ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED ON. IF THE PRESENT VERIOUS WERE ACCEPTED, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN, MY ANSWER IS WITH ALL OF THE OTHER QUESTIONS THAT GO TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS, I AM NOT GOING TO ANSWER IT. I AM SORRY.

Q DID THE COMMUNICATION FROM SADAT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS WORKING PAPER?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THAT WAS A PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION. I JUST REALLY CAN'T GET INTO IT.

Q I AM NOT ASKING FOR DETAILS OR SUBSTANCE. I AM ASKING IF IT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH IT.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: NOT AT ALL. I CAN'T ANSWER IT AT ALL. I JUST DON'T WANT TO GET INTO IT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

Q CAN WE EXCLUDE FROM WHAT IS IN THE WORKING PAPER --

IT KNOW THE MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE ARE MIXED IN -- BUT CAN WE EXCLUDE FROM THE SUBSTANCE IN THE SENSE OF TALING ABOUT TERRITORIAL INES AND THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND THE VARIOUS MATTERS WHICH ARE SUBSTANTIVE RATHER THAN PROCEDURAL?  
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SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I THINK YOU CAN TAKE THE DESCRIPTION WE HAVE BEEN GIVING. THIS DEALS WITH ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. THOSE ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE AND THE SOVIETS NOTED IN OUR JOINT STATEMENT, THERE ARE STILL DIFFERENCES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS.

Q BUT NOT BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THIS GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE A FIXED U.S. POSITION THAT WE ARE TRYING TO GET EVERYBODY TO SIGN ON. WE ARE WORKING IN A FLUID SITUATION ON WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO GET SOMETHING WHICH BOTH SIDES WILL AGREE TO. THIS REQUIRES EACH SIDE, AFTER WE GET REACTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE, TO SEE IF WE CAN MOVE A LITTLE CLOSER TOWARDS THE MIDDLE. THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WHICH WE ARE SIMPLY TRYING TO GIVE TO ALL THE PARTIES ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS.

Q DID THE UNITED STATES GIVE ISRAEL YESTERDAY SOME LIMITATIONS BEYOND WHICH IT WOULD NOT GO, A RED LINE, SO TO SPEAK?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: ON WHAT?

Q ON THE LIMITATIONS ABOUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD PROPOSE THAT COULD CONFLICT WITH THE ISRAELI POSITION AND THE ISRAELI POSITION OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS BOUND TO UNDER THE 1975 DECLARATION.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL; UNDER THE 1975 DECLARATION?

Q UNDER THE SINAI II AGREEMENT.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE STATEMENT LAST  
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NIGHT SAYS, "THE U.S. AND ISRAEL AGREED THAT ALL THE UNDER-STANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEM ON THIS SUBJECT" -- NAMELY, THE SUBJECT OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE -- "REMAINED IN FORCE."

Q THAT IS INCLUDING REFERENCE TO THE SINAI II AGREEMENT THEN?



SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THAT IS MEANT TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THE SINAI AGREEMENT.

Q WHAT PERCENTAGE OF TIME WAS SPENT IN THE SIX HOURS ON DEALING WITH THE U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT AND WHAT PERCENTAGE ON THE WORKING PAPER?

SENIOR U. S. OFFICIAL: I COULDN'T RECONSTRUCT IT IN PRECISE TERMS, BUT THE BULK OF IT WAS SPENT ON WORKING ON PROPOSALS FOR A WORKING PAPER FOR GENEVA; BUT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF THE OTHER.

Q YOU AGREE FAIRLY READILY TO ACCEPT A PUBLIC STATEMENT REAFFIRMING 242 AND 338?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: YES. SURE, WE WERE PREPARED TO DO THAT FROM THE BEGINNING. IN FACT, THE PRESIDENT RECONFIRMED IT IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

Q WAS THAT WRITTEN IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AS A RESULT OF THE FLAP --

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I DON'T KNOW THE SEQUENCE OF THE WRITING OF THE SPEECH BUT I CAN'T IN MY OWN MIND IMAGINE WE WOULDN'T IN A SPEECH, ON A STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST CONFIDENTIAL

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DEALING WITH GENEVA, I CAN'T IMAGINE WE WOULD NOT STATE OUR POSITION WHICH IS IT SHOULD BE BASED ON 242 AND 338.

Q BACK TO THE JOINT STATEMENT FOR A SECOND: WAS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THAT THAT THEY WOULD EXERT SOME INFLUENCE OR THEIR INFLUENCE AS MUCH AS THEY COULD ON THE PLO AND HAVE YOU SEEN ANY INDICATIONS OF DISCUSSIONS OR INFLUENCE BEING WIELDED ON THE PLO?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I THINK I SAID ON -- WAS IT SATURDAY WHEN WE MET? -- THAT WE HOPED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE WHERE THEY COULD TO TRY TO URGE FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE PARTIES ON THSE QUESTIONS THAT HAVE TO BE RESOLVED TO GET TO GENEVA.

I CAN'T TELL YOU WHETHER OR NOT THAT IS THE CASE AT THIS POINT, BUT IT CERTAINLY WAS AND REMAINS OUR HOPE.

Q IS IT DESIRABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THAT THE PLO ACCEPT 242 SO THAT THEY CAN PLAY A PART AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE?

SENIRO U.S. OFFICIAL: YOU KNOW, WE ARE GETTING WAY BACK -- I THINK WE ARE PLOWING GROUND WE HAVE PLOWED BEFORE. LET ME JUST GO BACK AND RECAPITULATE. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A NUJBER OF ARABS THAT WE OUGHT TO GET INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. WE SAID WE HAVE A COMMITMENT WITH ISRAEL UNDER THE SINAI II AGREEMENT THAT WE WILL ONLY DO THAT IF THE PLO ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 242 AND THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO EXIST WHICH INCLUDES ISRAEL.

THAT IS ALL WE HAVE SAID WILL HAPPEN IF THE PLO ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 242.

Q THAT IS WHAT I AM ASKING. IS IT DESIRABLE FROM  
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OUR POINT OF VIEW SHOULD THEY ACCEPT 242 THAT THEY BE REPRESENTED AT GENEVA?

SENIRO U.S. OFFICIAL: NO, THE QUESTION OF WHO IS REPRESENTED AT GENEVA IS NOT FOR US TO DECIDE. THIS IS SOMETHING THE PARTIES HAVE TO AGREE ON AND WE HAVE TO TRY TO HELP THEM REACH AGREEMENT.

Q WE CARRIED AN ITEM THIS MORNING WHICH SAID THE PLO YESTERDAY REQUESTED THE ARAB DELEGATIONS TO AGREE THAT THE PLO WOULD SELECT THE PALESTINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UNIFIED DELEGATION. NOW, IF THAT GOES THROUGH, WILL THAT BE ANY PROBLEM WITH THE AMERICAN FORMULATION OF HOW THIS CONFERENCE WILL CONVENE?

SENIRO U.S. OFFICIAL: I THINK IT DEPENDS ON THE AGREEMENT WE FINALLY GET AMONG THE PARTIES ON THE BASIS OF GENEVA. I CANNOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

1 LAST NIGHT DAYAN SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING A PALESTINIAN STATE, A STATUS WITH THE PALESTINIAN STATE AT GENEVA. BUT HE DIDN'T SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDE DISCUSSING A PALESTINIAN ENTITY. IN FACT, HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT AN ENTITY WAS. DO WE SEE A DISTINCTION THERE BETWEEN A STATE AND AN ENTITY TO THE EXTENT THAT THAT DISCUSSION OF AN ENTITY IS A POSSIBILITY AT GENEVA?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I DON'T WANT TO GIVE AN INTERPRETATION OF WHAT

DAYAN SAID. WE USED THE WORD "ENTITY" ADVISEDLY. THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID AT ONE TIME WE THINK A PREFERABLE ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE FOR ANY PALESTINIAN ENTITY TO BE LINKED TO JORDAN.  
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Q WE EXPECT AN ENTITY WILL BE DISCUSSED AT GENEVA?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WHAT IS DISCUSSED AT GENEVA WILL  
DEPEND ON WHAT THE PARTIES AGREE TO BE DISCUSSED.

Q THAT MEANS EXACTLY THE POINT I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO  
ASK NOW. YOU HAVE SAID AGAIN AND AGAIN NOW  
THAT THESE RECENT DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALL FOCUSED ON ORGAN-  
IZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS. IT HAS LONG BEEN THE  
POSITION NOT ONLY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION BUT OF PAST  
ADMINISTRATIONS THAT THERE IS NOT MUCH POINT IN GOING TO  
GENEVA JUST FOR THE SAKE OF GETTING A GENEVA CONFERENCE  
UNDERWAY THAT THERE HAS TO BE SOME CLEAR NOTION OF  
WHAT IS GOING TO COME OUT OF GENEVA.

THE ONLY CLEAR NOTION THAT HAS EMERGED IN THE PAST  
FEW DAYS IS, IN FACT, IN THE BROADEST SENSE, THE JOINT  
US-SOVIET PROPOSAL. IS THAT IN EFFECT NOW THE UMBRELLA  
AND THE ONLY OTHER NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE GOING TO TAKE PLACE  
NOW ARE GOING TO BE LIMITED STRICTLY TO ORGANIZATIONAL AND  
PROCEDURAL OR IS THERE GOING TO BE AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE  
WHAT WILL COME OUT OF GENEVA BEFORE YOU GO THERE?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: FIRST OF ALL, I WOULDN'T WANT TO LEAVE  
THE IMPRESSION THAT WE DON'T CONTINUE IN OUR MEETINGS TO  
DISCUSS SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS WITH THE PARTIES.  
BUT THE NEGOTIATING FOCUS NOW IS GETTING THE PROCEDURAL  
AND ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS RESOLVED.

IF WE GET THOSE RESOLVED, WE WILL GO TO GENEVA AND CONTINUE  
DISCUSSIONS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THERE.

THE US-SOVIET STATEMENT WAS A STATEMENT OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES  
WHICH WE AND THE SOVIETS COULD JOINTLY AGREE ON THAT WE  
FEEL OUGHT TO BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BY THE PARTIES  
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AT GENEVA. BUT WE ARE NOT SAYING THEY HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED  
OR AGREED TO OR NOT AGREED TO BEFORE GENEVA.

Q I AM SURE YOU UNDERSTAND THE THRUST OF MY QUESTION AND  
IN FACT YOUR ANSWER SEEMS TO BE SUGGESTING THAT THE UNITED  
STATES IS NOW PREPARED TO GO TO GENEVA WITHOUT REALLY  
KNOWING WHAT IS GOING TO COME OUT OF THAT CONFERENCE,

WITHOUT HAVING ANY CLEAR SENSE OF WHERE IT IS GOING TO GO.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I THINK IN MY OWN MIND THAT HAS BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO KNOW WHAT IS GOING TO COME OUT OF THE CONFERENCE UNTIL YOU GET TO THE CONFERENCE.

Q I THINK THERE IS CLEARLY A CHANGE IN TACTICS. AND I WANTED TO ASK YOU BECAUSE WHEN MR. VANCE WENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, EACH TIME HE TALKED TO US, HE SAID, I THINK, MORE EMPHATICALLY THAT HE WAS DEALING WITH SUBSTANCE AND THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS THAT COULD BE SAID THE BETTER OFF, THE BETTER PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE.

ISRAEL'S POSITION HAS BEEN, LET'S GET TO GENEVA AND NEGOTIATE THERE. WON'T YOU CHANGE YOUR APPROACH NOW, WHICH I THINK YOU HAVE TO, AND THEY SAY WHY? IS IT BECAUSE THE ISRAELI VIEW IS SO DIFFERENT FROM THE AMERICAN VIEW?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: DIPLOMACY IS THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE. WE HAVE TO KEEP ADJUSTING OURSELVES AS TO WHAT IS POSSIBLE AS WE GO ON.

Q THE ISRAELIS WERE THE PEOPLE WHO SAID CONCENTRATE ON PROCEDURE, RIGHT? THE JORDANIANS TO A DEGREE, SYRIA WANTED THINGS SETTLED BEFOREHAND.  
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SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: WE ARE NOT THERE YET, BUT AT THIS POINT ALL THE PARTIES -- NOT JUST US -- ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY, I THINK, FOCUSING THEIR ATTENTION ON WHO DO YOU RESOLVE THE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS SO YOU CAN GET TO GENEVA AND CONTINUE DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING SOMEWHAT.

Q CAN YOU GIVE US A PHYSICAL TIMETABLE, WHAT DO YOU ANTICIPATE FROM HERE ON?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: I DON'T KNOW WHEN PRECISELY WE WILL HEAR BACK FROM THE ISRAELIS. I DON'T KNOW WHEN PRECISELY WE WILL HEAR BACK FROM THE ARABS.

WE HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH ALL OF THEM.

Q ARE THERE ANY FURTHER MEETINGS PLANNED WITH DAYAN?

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE NONE PLANNED, BUT THIS IS SOMETHING IF DAYAN FEELS HE WOULD LIKE TO COME BACK, I AM SURE WE WILL FIND THE TIME. YOU HAVE TO

SOR OF JUDGE EACH NEXT STEP ON THE BASIS OF WHERE YOU  
GOT AT THE LAST STEP.

Q I GATHER FROM WHAT YOU ARE SAYING, IT WOULD SEEM  
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE FROM YOUR EXPECTATIONS THAT ANYTHING  
IS GOING TO BE RESOLVED BY SATURDAY BY THE TIME THE  
SECRETARY IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE HERE.

SENIRO U.S. OFFICIAL: I CERTAINLY DON'T WANT TO SAY  
WE ARE CONFIDENT IT WILL BE RESOLVED BY SATURDAY. THAT  
SHOULD NOT BECOME AN ARTIFICIAL DEADLINE.

MR. SHERMAN: (HE) HAS TO GO TO THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON.  
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LET'S TAKE ONE MORE.

Q HOW RELEVANT IS THE U.S.-SOVIET DECLARATION TODAY?

SENIRO U.S. OFFICIAL: AS IT SAID AT THE BEGINNING, IT  
REMAINS IN EFFECT AS THE VIEW OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN BUT WE  
DON'T EXPECT EVERYONE TO AGREE WITH ALL THE PARTS OF THAT  
DECLARATION. IT IS RELEVANT AS THE STATEMENT SAYS.

MR. SHERMAN: THAT IS IT.

THE PRESS: THANK YOU.

SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL: THANK YOU. GOODBYE.  
VANCE  
XUNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009